Abstract. In the last decade, mobile communication has enjoyed unprecedented growth all over the world. The recent advances in mobile communication technologies including Global Positioning System (GPS) and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) have propelled the growth of a number of mobile services. Typically, these require maintaining the mobile objects' location and profile information and efficiently serving access requests on the past, present and future status of the moving objects. This creates inherent security and privacy challenges. One solution to this is to specify security policies to ensure controlled access. However, this significantly degrades system performance. To alleviate this, Atluri and Guo have proposed an unified index structure, S TPR-tree, to organize both the moving objects and authorizations specified over them. A significant limitation of this approach is that it is unable to store past location information of objects and is therefore not capable of supporting security policies based on tracking of mobile users. In this paper, we propose a new unified index structure, called the S P P F -tree, which maintains past, present and future positions of the moving objects along with authorizations by employing partial persistent storage. Besides demonstrating how the S P P F -tree can be constructed and maintained, we provide algorithms to process queries where either the subject or the object or both are mobile. We provide a comprehensive experimental evaluation to establish the scalability and performance of our approach.
Introduction
In the last decade, mobile communication has enjoyed unprecedented growth all over the world. The recent advances in mobile communication technologies including Global Positioning System (GPS) and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) have propelled the growth of a number of mobile services. A particularly thriving example is that of location based services (LBS). A location-based service delivers personalized services to mobile customers based on their location. Popular examples of location based services include: providing nearby points of interest based on the real-time location of the mobile customer, advising of current conditions such as traffic and weather, delivering personalized, location-aware, and context-sensitive advertising based on mobile customer profiles and preferences, or providing routing and tracking information. By
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definition, delivery of a location based service requires knowledge of a mobile object's location. Along with the location information, the preference profiles of the customers carrying the mobile objects must also be maintained. Effective delivery requires efficient processing of access requests to find the past, present and future status of the moving objects.
However, this creates a significant challenge. Since effective delivery of a mobile service may need to locate and track a mobile customer, and gain access to his/her profile, a number of security and privacy concerns are raised. Location information has the potential to allow an adversary to physically locate a person. As such, wireless subscribers carrying mobile devices have legitimate concerns about their personal safety, if such information should fall into the wrong hands. Moreover, privacy of mobile users can be compromised by disclosing their location because location contains access to other spatiotemporal resources, such as meetings, medical facilities, home, or even crime scenes. Thus, location can be used to infer other personal information about an individual, such as political affiliations, state of health, or personal preferences. Therefore, it is important that the sensitive location information is revealed only on a need-to-know basis, when allowed.
In summary, in a mobile environment, there are a number of applications that require controlled access to the mobile user profiles, to their current location and movement trajectories, to mobile resources, and to stationary resources based on the user's spatiotemporal information. To incorporate security, an appropriate access control mechanism must be in place to enforce the authorization specifications reflecting the above security and privacy needs. One way to take these concerns into account is by establishing security policies and enforcing them for every access. A comprehensive security policy can encode spatio-temporal restrictions on access to location, profile, etc.
Traditionally, access policies are specified as a set of authorizations, where each authorization states if a given subject possesses privileges to access an object. Considering the basic authorization specification subject, object, privilege , in a mobile environment, because both a subject and an object can be a moving object, to avoid confusion, from now on, we use the following notation. We denote the objects specified in the authorization as auth-objects (stands for authorization objects), and denote moving objects as simply objects. Access requests in such an environment can typically be on past, present and future status of the moving objects. For example, a sales manager of a store may want to find the customers (i) who have visited the store during last week (past locations), (ii) who are currently located within 1 mile to the store (current locations), and (iii) who will possibly be in the vicinity of the store in the next 30 minutes (future locations). Serving an access request requires searching for the desired moving objects that satisfy the query, as well as identifying and enforcing the relevant security policies.
While this solves the security problem, it creates a performance problem. Often, enforcing security incurs overhead, and as a result may degrade the performance of a system. However, the key insight is to realize that a lot of duplicate work is performed for both accesses. Thus, one way to alleviate this problem and to effectively serve access requests, is to efficiently organize the mobile objects as well as authorizations. Towards this end, recently Atluri and Guo [8] have proposed a unified index structure called S TPR-tree in which authorizations are carefully overlaid on a moving object index structure (TPR-tree), based on their spatiotemporal parameters. This significantly reduces the performance surcharge due to security.
However, a significant limitation of the S TPR-tree is that it is not capable of maintaining past information. This is due to fact that inherently TPR-trees themselves do not allow storage of past information. As a result, it is not possible to support queries based on past location and security policies based on tracking of mobile users. There are many cases where the path taken to reach a particular location is quite important. Knowledge of the trajectory of a mobile object is also extremely important to track it. This is a real problem that must be solved to take secure location based services to the next level.
In this paper, we present a new unified index structure, called S P P F -tree, which maintains past, present and future positions of the moving objects along with authorizations by employing partial persistent storage. In particular, we build on the concepts of the R P P F -tree [18] and overlay authorizations suitably on the nodes of the index tree. Essentially, a partial persistent structure keeps all past states of the data being indexed, but updates only the newest version. We demonstrate how the S P P F -tree can be constructed and maintained, and provide algorithms to process access requests. Specifically, we support three types of access requests: requests for moving objects by stationary subjects, requests for stationary objects by moving subjects, and requests for moving objects by moving subjects. The first and third type of requests, in addition to retrieving the moving objects in a specific spatiotemporal region, allow retrieving the location of the moving objects as well as their trajectories. As such our model would support security policies based on tracking of moving objects. We conduct a thorough experimental evaluation of our S P P F -tree to establish its scalability and performance and to establish the situations where it works well. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our moving object authorization model. In section 3, we present the system architecture for a mobile application environment. We present the preliminaries in section 4. In section 5, we present our proposed novel unified index structure, the S P P F -tree and illustrate our approach and strategy to overlay authorizations on top of the R P P F -tree. In this section, we also describe how access requests are evaluated. In section 6 we present the results of our performance evaluation studies. Related work is presented in section 7. In section 8, we conclude the paper by providing some insight into directions for future research in this area.
Moving Object Authorization Model
In this section, we introduce an authorization model for moving object data, which is an extension of the model proposed in [5] . In a moving object environment, authorization specifications should be capable of expressing access control policies based on spatiotemporal attributes of both subjects and objects. An authorization can be defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Authorization).
An authorization, denoted as α, is a 4 tuple ce, ge, p, τ , where ce is a credential expression denoting a set of subjects, ge is an auth-object ex-pression denoting a set of auth-objects, p is a set of privilege modes, and τ is a temporal term.
The formalism to specify ce, ge and τ has been developed in [5] , and also, Ardagna et al. [3] have proposed formalisms to specify location-based conditions in access control policies separately.
-Subject expression (ce) is a boolean formula of terms that refer to a set of subjects by specifying profiles of users, location predicates (spatiotemporal restriction), and so on. -Auth-object expression (ge) is a boolean formula of terms that refer to a set of objects by specifying the membership of the auth-objects in categories, values of properties on metadata, and location predicates (spatiotemporal restriction), and so on.
Similar to [5] , we assume that a subject is associated with a set of credentials which might belong to different credential domains. A credential domain is a set of related hierarchically organized credential classes. Each credential class in a credential domain is associated with a set of attributes. Each subject credential is an instantiation of attributes of a credential class in a specific domain. Lower level credential classes may inherit attributes, and as a result, inherit authorizations from those at upper levels. A credential expression, ce, is used to express a set of credentials, which in turn specifies a group of subjects. The followings are the examples for ce and ge.
-ce 1 ={emp(x) ∧ human resource(x) ∧ rectangle(y) = (10,50,10,10)
ce 1 denotes a set of subjects who are employees at the human resource department in an area centered at (10,50) with width and height of 10 during 5pm and 9pm. ce 2 denotes two employees with employee IDs 15 and 30. ge 1 denotes a set of patrol cars dispatched from the Newark police station, and ge 2 specifies all the customers in a region centered at (20,30) with width 10 and height 50 during 6pm and 10pm. While ce 2 and ge 1 denote a set of subjects and objects, respectively, by identifiers, ce 1 and ge 2 include a combination of spatiotemporal and traditional attributes. Note that the set of subjects and objects denoted by ce and ge can be moving objects. For a given authorization α = ce, ge, m, τ , we denote subjects expressed by ce as α.ce, objects expressed by ge as α.ge, privileges as α.m, respectively. Also, [α.τ b , α.τ e ] denotes the time interval during which α is valid.
Our model supports not only read, write, and execute privileges for traditional auth-objects but also viewing and compose for moving objects with spatiotemporal attributes. Viewing privileges allow subjects to read the spatiotemporal information. We support two types of viewing privileges: Locate and Track privileges. 1 Locate privilege enables subjects to read the location information of moving objects in the authorized spatiotemporal region. On the contrary, track privilege enables subjects to read the trajectory information of moving objects in the authorized spatiotemporal region. Compose privileges allow subjects to write information on the auth-objects. τ can be a time point, a time interval or a set of time intervals. In the following, we present some examples of security policies in which moving objects can be subjects, auth-objects or both. Also, the authorizations can be specified on the spatiotemporal attributes of subjects, auth-objects or both. These are summarized in table 1.
-Policy 1: A mobile (phone/service) customer is willing to reveal his personal profile information to a merchant only during the evening hours, and while he is close to the shopping mall. In this case, only the auth-object is a moving object and this policy is based on auth-object's spatiotemporal attributes. -Policy 2: An employee is allowed to enter the document repository only between "9am and 5pm" and while physically located "in the office premises." Note that while subjects are moving objects, the auth-objects are not. Also note that the policy is based on the subject's spatiotemporal attributes.
Table 1. Categorization of Policies
Moving object Spatiotemporal Specification Policy 1 auth-object auth-object Policy 2 subject subject Policy 3 subject, auth-object subject, auth-object Policy 4 auth-object Policy 5 auth-object auth-object -Policy 3: An airport security official can access the trajectory information of travelers in the airport only while he is on-duty (i.e., during 11pm-7am). In this case, both the subject (security official) and the auth-object (travelers) are moving objects. This policy is based on the spatiotemporal attributes of both subject and authobject. -Policy 4: Certain FBI agent can access the current location and trajectory information of truck with id 325. Note that although the subject and the auth-object are moving objects, the subject is allowed to access the information regardless of his location and time. In this case, the policy is based on the identifiers of both subject (FBI agent) and auth-object (truck with id 325). -Policy 5: A police office in Newark, NJ can access only the dispatched patrol cars from the Newark area. Note that only auth-object (patrol cars) is a moving object. Also, the policy is specified on two types of auth-objects: object identifiers (patrol cars from Newark police station) and spatiotemporal region (Newark).
The above policies can be specified as the following authorizations. 
System Architecture for a Mobile Application Environment
We assume the system in a location service environment comprises of the following components. Location Service (LS): We assume that there exists a location service that maintains the mobile customers' location and profile information, and LS is a trusted third party as in [26] . The current location of moving objects are stored and updated accordingly in order to provide most up-to-date location information to a requester. In this architecture, we assume that the moving object data is represented using the Moving Objects SpatioTemporal (MOST) model [22] due to its simplicity and popularity in the literature. The continuous movement of mobile objects makes maintenance of location information extremely challenging. In the MOST, location information is treated as a dynamic attribute and is represented as a linear function of time [26] . This approach reduces the update frequency because the location information is updated only if the predicted location deviates from the actual location more than a certain threshold. Location information can be directly provided by users' mobile devices using wireless communication periodically, or acquired from the installed sensors. For example, the Active Badge [24] detects the location of each user in a building. Each individual carries a device called, badge, which is associated with the identifier of the user. A building is equipped with sensors detecting positions of badges. A person's location is determined by using an active badge which emits a signal every 15 seconds. A master station, which works as LS, collects the location information, and makes it available to users.
Requester: A requester is a subscriber to a service in order to gain access to the resources that LS offers. In a mobile environment, there are two types of resources that a requester can gain access to: static resources (e.g. repository room or printer) and mobile resources (location of vehicles). For example, consider a work environment where all the documents can only be accessed by employees only while they are physically located in the office. Policy 2 in section 2 is an example that mimics the same policy for electronic documents. When a mobile requester submits an access request to the documents in the repository, LS checks the physical location of the requester, and only if the requester is within premises of the office, he is given access. ABng book library [2] is one such example to protect the books in the library. An Active Badge is used to authenticate the user and subsequently open the library door lock [2] . In this case, the requesters are obviously mobile. However, in some cases, the location of requesters is always fixed (e.g., the merchants in Policy 1 in section 2), and thus, the location does not play any role in evaluating the request.
We assume that the location information as well as the security policies are maintained by the LS. Under our framework, LS is also responsible for enforcing the specified security policies. Therefore, to efficiently enforce the access requests, LS maintains the proposed unified index, as shown in figure 1 . The access requests are processed by the LS, which searches the index for the authorized data that adheres to the specified security policies. Specifically, when a user (mobile or stationary) sends an access request (1), access control evaluation module searches relevant authorizations that are applicable to the submitted access request. The query sent to the mobile object and authorization database essentially searches the unified index to identify the mobile objects that satisfy the query and the security policies of the user that are relevant to the query (2) . The retrieved data from the unified index (3) is the identifiers of moving object data which satisfies the existing security policies as well as the user access request. If a user wants to access the location or trajectory information, moving object processing module associates the required information such as location or trajectory with the retrieved identifiers. Finally, the resultant mobile objects are sent to the requester (4).
Preliminaries
In this section, we present the partial persistence framework and review the R P P F -tree [18] , a moving object index that maintains not only the present and anticipated f uture positions of moving objects, but also their past positions.
Representation of Moving Objects:
Let the set of moving objects be O={o 1 , . . . , o n }. In the d-dimensional space, objects are specified as points which move with constant velocityv = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v d } and initial locationx = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x d }. The position x(t) of an object at time t(t ≥ t 0 ) can be computed through the linear function of time, x(t) =x(t 0 ) +v(t − t 0 ) where t 0 is the initial time, andx(t 0 ) the initial position. Considering a two-dimensional space, a moving object o i moving in x, y space can be represented as
Time Parameterized Bounding Rectangle (tpbr): Given a set of moving objects O = {o 1 , . . . , o n } in the time interval [t 0 , t 0 + δt] in x, y, t space, the tpbr of O is a 3-dimensional bounding trapezoid which bounds all the moving objects in O during the entire time interval [t 0 , t 0 + δt] in the following way:
Then, we can compute the bounding rectangles that tpbr covers with respect to time. The bounding rectangle's x-axis interval and y-axis interval at time t are defined as [x (t),
Time Horizon (H):
Given a moving object, it is unrealistic to assume that its velocity remains constant. Therefore, the predicted future location of a object specified as a linear function of time becomes less and less accurate as time elapses [19] . To address this issue, a time horizon H is defined, which represents the time interval during which the velocities of the moving objects assumed to be the same. Figure 2 shows how tpbr bounds the trajectory of two moving objects o 1 and o 2 in [t 0 , t 0 + H].
The Tree Structure: Given a set of tpbrs, they can be organized in a hierarchical structure. In figure 3 , tpbr C encloses tpbrs A and B. These three can be organized as a hierarchical structure with A and B being the children of C. Essentially, at the bottommost level of the hierarchy, a set of moving objects could be grouped to form tpbrs. Each tpbr of the next higher level is the bounding tpbr of the set of tpbrs of all of its children. The root of the hierarchy is thus the bounding tpbr covering all its lower level The Partial Persistence Framework: Partial persistence is a data structure that keeps all past states of the data being indexed, but applies updates only to the newest version. It is based on the following important concepts. -Evolution of Index Nodes and Data Entry: In order to be transformed to a partially persistent structure, each index (leaf or index) node and data entry (moving object) include two additional fields for maintaining the evolution of the index records: insertion time and deletion time. These are denoted as N.insertionT ime and N.deletionT ime for node N . If a new moving object is available and captured at time t 0 , its insertion time is set to t 0 and deletion time is set to ∞. When the object is logically deleted from the index at time t d , its deletion time is changed from ∞ to t d . The same rule applies to index nodes. A node or a data entry is said to be dead if its deletion time is less than ∞, otherwise it is said to be alive. -Time Split: When an update (insertion or deletion) occurs at a node N , it may result in structural changes if it becomes underfull or overfull. If this is the case, a time-split occurs to N . The time-split on N at time t is performed by copying all alive entries in N at t to a new leaf node L and timestamp of both L and those copied entries are set to [t, ∞). In addition, the deletion time of N is set to t, and N is considered dead. Then, the new node L is investigated further in order to incorporate it into the tree. Essentially, three different cases may arise: (i) split: If L is overfull, split it into two nodes and then insert these two nodes into the tree.
Root Array
(ii) merge: If L is underfull, accommodate by merging it with another node. (iii) no change: If L is neither overfull or underfull, insert it directly into the tree. After the structural change, the tpbr of the parent node may need to be updated accordingly and the described process may be repeated up to the root node. If the root node is time-split at time t, a pointer to the new alive node together with timestamp [t, ∞) is added to a special root array that is stored in the main memory [18] . Note that if the tree is constructed at t 0 and time split for the alive root element of the root array occurs at {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n }, each root element in the root array is associated with time interval [t 0 , t 1 ), [t 1 , t 2 ), . . . , [t n−1 , t n ), and [t n , ∞). The associated time interval for each root element represents the valid structure of the tree during those time intervals. Thus, if we want to know the status of the tree at time t, we simply need to find a root element r from the root array such that the time interval of r includes t.
In the following, we explain the concept of time-split, root array, dead and alive nodes by taking a concrete example. Consider a tree with a node that can hold 5 data entries. Obviously, the node is considered underfull if the number of data entries is less than 2, and overfull if the number of data entries is more than 5. . Because L is also overfull, it is split into two nodes, which are inserted to the tree. A new root entry is added, forming a root array. The previous root's deletion time is set to 4, representing it as a dead node, and the newly created root has the insertion and deletion times as [4,∞) , as shown in Figure 5 . In all the figures, the dead nodes are shaded.
-At t = 5: Moving object o 2 is deleted and o 7 is inserted. Therefore, the deletion time of o 2 is set to 5, and o 7 is inserted into the tree with the insertion and deletion times [5, ∞) . Figure 6 represents this event. -At t = 6: Moving objects o 3 and o 7 are deleted. So, deletion time of these objects are set to 6. Because the deletion of o 3 results in the underfull of the node L 1 that stores o 3 , a time split occurs: another new node K is created and alive entry o 1 is copied there. Since newly created node K is underfull, it is merged with its neighboring alive node L 2 . The deletion time of the node L 1 is set to 6, representing that L 1 is dead. The resultant data structure is shown in figure 7 .
When update occurs, the resulting trajectory of a moving object may consist of disconnected and slightly incorrect segments because at the insertion of the object, the predicted future positions can be different from the actual positions. Therefore, during update, the last-recorded trajectory segment of an object needs to be updated. It may be stored in more than one leaf node because the leaf node in question may have been time split a number of times since the previous updates [18] . R P P F -tree corrects the last-recorded trajectory segment by visiting all leaf nodes that contain copies of the segment and also tightens the tpbr accordingly. For example, in figure 7, suppose the actual location of o 3 turns out to be different from the predicted location during update (deletion). Then, after setting the deletion time of o 3 as 6, all the nodes that include the trajectory of o 3 since the last update (insertion of o 3 at t = 3) are updated to point the actual location of o 3 correctly. The first root element and the node L 1 is such a case.
The S P P F -Tree
In this section, we present our proposed unified index, the S P P F -tree that indexes authorizations as well as the moving objects by capturing their past, present, and future locations. As a result, we can now support authorizations based on locate and track privileges.
Authorization Overlaying
Our approach is to first construct an R P P F -tree for moving objects, and then appropriately overlay authorizations on top of each node of the index by carefully examining the spatiotemporal extents of both the node and the authorizations. Our overlaying strategy allows for efficient evaluation of user access requests for the specified moving objects. The resulting tree is the S P P F -tree. Authorizations are categorized as follows based on whether or not a spatiotemporal extent is associated with subjects and auth-objects.
-Moving Subject on Static Auth-Object Authorization (α M S ): An authorization α is said to be moving subject on static auth-object authorization, denoted as α M S , if α.ce is associated with the spatiotemporal extent, but not the auth-object. -Static Subject on Moving Auth-Object Authorization (α SM ): An authorization α is said to be static subject on moving auth-object authorization, denoted α SM , if only α.ge is associated with the spatiotemporal extent, but not α.ce.
-Moving Subject on Moving Auth-Object Authorization (α M M ): An authorization α is said to be moving subject on moving auth-object authorization, denoted as α M M if both of α.ce and α.ge are associated with the spatiotemporal extents.
In our tree, we are capable of overlaying if the authorization is specified based on the spatiotemporal extent of not only ce or ge, but also both. For a given authorization α, we denote the spatiotemporal extent of the authorization as α 2 . In case of α M S or α SM , there is only one case of computing spatiotemporal extent because the spatiotemporal extent is from either ce or ge. In case of α M M , we denote the spatiotemporal extent associated with α.ce as α 2S and α.ge as α 2O because we need to differentiate the origin of the spatiotemporal extent. Because we overlay authorizations of type α M M only based on α 2S , we denote α 2S as α 2 in case of α M M . Also, we denote the spatiotemporal extent (tpbr) of a node N as N 2 . We assume that α 2 is a contiguous spatiotemporal region without losing any generality because each non-continuous spatiotemporal region in α can be sliced to form a single contiguous spatiotemporal region.
A node of S P P F -tree is similar to that of R P P F -tree except that it includes three pointers that point to the three different types of authorizations. For a given node N , we use N.α M S , N.α SM , and N.α M M to refer to the set of overlaid authorizations of types α M S , α M S , and α M M , respectively. Let the binary operators ⊃ {x,y,t} , ∩ {x,y,t} and ⊗ {x,y,t} denote enclose, overlap and disjoint, respectively, in all x, y and t dimensions.
Algorithm 1 Overlay 1:
Input: root array R, authorization α 2: Output: authorizations-overlaid S P P F -tree 3: for each root r from R do 4:
OverlaySubtree(r, α) 6: end if 7: end for Algorithm 1 Overlay presents the details of our overlaying strategy. Essentially, the algorithm first selects the root nodes from the root array R such that the root node's alive time interval is overlapped with the authorization's effective time interval [τ b , τ e ]. Then, for each selected root node r, it traverses the tree recursively starting from the root node r to the leaf level in a way that for each node N in the traversal path, α 2 is compared with N 2 . All the possible scenarios for this comparison are as follows:
-Case 1: If the spatiotemporal extent of α fully encloses that of the node N , i.e., α 2 ⊃ {x,y,t} N 2 is true, we will stop traversing and overlay α on N by adding
This is because, if a subject is allowed to access objects within a certain spatiotemporal region, that is α 2 , it is allowed to access if α is a moving subject static auth-object type of authorization then 9:
else if α is a static subject moving auth-object type of authorization then 11: auth-begin event auth-end event Fig. 8 . Authorization Time Line objects in the subregion of that [8] . 2 After overlaying an authorization on a node, it is not necessary to overlay the same authorization on any of its descendants. -Case 2: If the spatiotemporal extent of α overlaps with that of the node N , i.e., N 2 ∩ {x,y,t} α 2 is true, the level of the node decides where it is overlaid.
• If N is a non-leaf node, each of N 's children are traversed and the algorithm repeats the comparison between α 2 and the spatiotemporal extent of each child node. The goal here is to check if there exist a child of N whose spatiotemporal extent is enclosed by that of α.
• If the node N is a leaf node, we overlay α on the leaf node N . This is because, when the spatiotemporal extent of the authorization does not enclose, but overlaps with that of the leaf node N 2 , we need to ensure that no relevant authorizations are discarded. Also, note that only part of the spatiotemporal extent of N 2 is in the authorized region. The moving objects from the remaining unauthorized spatiotemporal region N 2 − α 2 must be removed from the user's output, if the user request includes this region. -Case 3: Else, which implies the spatiotemporal extent of the authorization, α 2 is disjoint with that of the node N 2 , i.e., N 2 ⊗ {x,y,t} α 2 is true, we stop the overlaying process. This is because, if α does not have privilege to the region covered by N 2 , then α is not applicable to that region. Also, since N 2 includes spatiotemporal extent of all its children nodes, α 2 is disjoint with the spatiotemporal extent of each child. Therefore, there is no need to traverse further to the leaf level. Let us take a concrete example to explain the overlaying concept. Suppose an authorization α is being overlaid on the tree, and N 1 is the root node whose effective time interval is overlapped with that of α, i.e., [N 1 .insertionT ime, N 1 .deletionT ime) ∩ [α.τ b , α.τ e ] = ∅. In figure 9 shows that the spatiotemporal extent of α and N 1 is overlapped, i.e., α 2 ∩ {x,y,t} N 2 1 is true. Therefore, we recursively visit all of its children, i.e., N 2 and N 3 . When N 2 is visited, observe that the spatiotemporal extent of α encloses that of N 2 . Therefore, we stop traversing the tree further and overlay α on N 2 . However, when we visit N 3 , the spatiotemporal extent of α is disjoint with that of N 3 . Thus, we also stop traversing the tree, and we do not need any further actions.
We now consider the computational complexity of the algorithm. In the worst case, each subtree could contain all of the moving objects, and each moving object could exist in a separate leaf. Thus, in the worst case, each subtree traversal would require visiting all of the nodes, thus requiring O(n) time. Now, the only remaining factor is the size of the root array. This depends on the number of time splits as well as the number of updates. Assuming that there are k elements in the root array, the overall worst case complexity of the algorithm is O(nk).
Maintenance of the S P P F -tree
One main challenge of the S P P F -tree is to maintain the overlaid authorizations as the tree evolves. Changes to the S P P F -tree are needed due to the following two reasons: It is important to note that, while the spatiotemporal region of an overlaid authorization is static in nature, the tpbr of each node in the tree changes over time. Therefore, it is possible that certain overlaid authorizations may no longer satisfy the conditions. As a result, it may be necessary to reposition the existing overlaid authorization. -Change of applicable authorizations: If the overlaid authorizations are valid only during a certain time interval, as time elapses, they are no longer applicable. Therefore, these need to be removed from the node where they are overlaid. Also, certain new authorizations may become applicable, which need to be overlaid appropriately.
Because the S P P F -tree is a unified index that maintains not only moving objects but also authorizations, we need to pay attention to how updates of one type can be performed without hampering the properties of the S P P F -tree.
Handling Updates due to Change of Applicable Authorizations:
To handle this issue, we introduce the notion of Authorization Log, described below.
Authorization Log: An authorization log is nothing but a data structure constructed by spreading all the authorizations on the time line. For each authorization, we consider the following two events: (1) auth-begin event and (2) auth-end event. These two are nothing but [τ b , τ e ] specified in the authorization specification. 3 For example, in figure  8 , the auth-begin event of the authorization α 1 occurs at time t 15 , and the auth-end event will occur at time t 28 .
Essentially, as time elapses, new authorizations may become applicable and we do not want to miss overlaying these authorizations on the S P P F -tree. An authorization α is said to be applicable to the tree constructed at t, if the two time intervals [α.τ b , α.τ e ] and [t, t + H] overlap. For example, suppose the S P P F -tree is constructed at t = t 10 , which is valid until t 10 + 2 (assuming H = 2). Referring to figure 8, only α 2 , α 3 , and α 4 are overlaid on the tree. Since valid intervals of α 1 and α 5 are outside [t 10 , t 10 + 2], they are not applicable now and therefore are not overlaid on the tree. On the other hand, at t 20 , both α 1 and α 5 must have been overlaid on the tree. However, the tree has no capability to keep track of newly applicable authorizations that need to be overlaid on the appropriate nodes of the tree. An auth-begin event triggers the algorithm 2 OverlaySubtree procedure to take care of this issue. For example, α 1 in figure 8 will be overlaid on the tree at t 13 because the tree is valid up to the current time + H. Re-overlaying of authorizations due to updates to moving objects 3 Note that each authorization will have only two such events since we are not considering periodic authorizations. However, our proposed solution can be easily extended to handle periodic authorizations.
Algorithm 3 UpdateS
P P F -Tree 1: Input: old moving object data E0, new moving object data En 2: Output: updated S P P F -tree 3: changedP ageIds ← Update(E0, En) {Update() is the slightly modified version of update method of R P P F -tree, which returns updated node identifiers} 4: changedN odeSet ← GetNodeSet(vhangedP ageIds) {GetNodeSet() returns the pointers of the identifiers in changedPageIds} 5: for each node N in changedN odeSet do 6:
Initialize overlaid authorizations in N {N.α M S , N.α SM , and N.α M M becomes null} 8:
for each authorization α in tempAuth do 9:
parent ← parent node of N 10:
if α 2 ⊃ {x,y,t} parent 2 is true then 11: overlayParent(N, α) {similar to overlaySubtree() but overlays α to the parent level until the root node is reached} 12: else 13: OverlaySubtree(N, α) 14:
end if 15:
end for 16: end for 17: AuthSet ← AuthLog.find auth(tc, tc + H){ tc is the current time} 18: for each α in AuthSet do 19: Overlay(alive root node, α) 20: end for Also, after some time later, certain overlaid authorizations become invalid and therefore must be removed from the tree. This is taken care by the auth-end event to trigger such removals. The removed authorization needs to be re-overlaid on the S P P F -tree because it may satisfy the overlaying conditions of another node in the tree.
In addition to triggering the overlaying and deletion of authorizations, update must take care of the cases when the time-split occurs. In this case, an entirely new node will be created for which there exist no overlaid authorizations. The find-auth method computes all the authorizations overlapping with the interval of the newly created nodes. 4 Figure 10 depicts the relationship between the authorization log and the S P P F -tree along with the auth-begin and auth-end events, and the find-auth method.
Handling Updates due to Changes to Moving Objects:
Updates to moving objects may cause a structural change to the S P P F -tree. When update (insertion/deletion) occurs on the S P P F -tree, all the access nodes, which are ancestors of the leaf node for which the update is applied to, need to be checked because the overlaid authorizations in the nodes may either be degraded authorizations (authorizations which were originally overlaid on the access nodes, but no longer fit in their original positions due to the spatiotemporal enlargement of the nodes by updates) or upgraded authorizations (authorizations which were originally overlaid on the access nodes, but able to fit in an ancestor of their original positions due to spatiotemporal shrinkage of the nodes by updates). This procedure is even more complicated if the update process results in the structural changes due to time-split. The details are summarized below.
Updating authorizations on the adjusted nodes:
Based on the periodic updates on the position of the moving objects, the tpbr of each node in the S P P F -tree will be adjusted; they may either shrink or expand. Moreover, adjustments to the tpbr of a node may trigger adjustments to the tpbrs of its ancestor nodes. For each adjusted node N , every overlaid authorization α on it can fall into one of the three categories: (i) degraded authorization, (ii) upgraded authorization, (iii) no changes. The algorithm 3 UpdateS P P F -tree presents the details of our updating strategy. It checks first if it is an upgraded authorization and attempts to overlay it as high in the tree as possible. Else, the same overlaying strategy is used to find the appropriate position for α. Figure 11 shows these three different cases. Suppose N 2 is the adjusted leaf node. Figure 11 (a) shows the shrinkage of the tpbr for N 2 and its parents. The authorization initially overlaid on N 1 is now repositioned to N 0 : it can enclose N 2 1 as well as N 2 0 spatiotemporally and therefore becomes an upgraded authorization. On the other hand, the tpbr of N 2 may be expanded due to the adjustment. Figure 11 (b) shows this expanded case, and that the overlaid authorization does not enclose N 2 1 spatiotemporally any more. It becomes a downgraded authorization. Therefore, it is repositioned to the child of N 1 , i.e., N 2 . In addition, it may be possible that the shrinkage or expansion of the corrected node does not affect the overlaid authorizations if the overlaid authorization still encloses N 2 1 but does not enclose its parent N 0 spatiotemporally. Figure 11 (c) presents this case.
Overlaying authorizations on the newly created node:
The newly created node due to a time-split does not have any authorizations overlaid on it. Therefore, all the authorizations whose valid time intervals are overlapped with the interval of this node are overlaid on the alive root node from the root array.
Access Request Evaluation
In this section, we present different types of access requests and how these are evaluated against the specified authorizations to retrieve the information that satisfies the user request. There exist three different request scenarios based on the mobility of requestors and resources, and the corresponding authorizations in order to protect the resources.
-Static Requests upon Mobile Resources: In this case, requestors are static entities while resources are moving objects. (e.g., a merchant (static requestor) tries to send promotion deals to near-by mobile customers (mobile resources) as in policy 1 in section 2.) Thus, only the location of mobile resources plays an important role for making the access control decision. Therefore, in order for requestors to gain access to the information of mobile resources, security/privacy policies must have been issued to the requestors in advance, and only if the specified conditions in the privacy/security policies are met, the requestors are able to access the information.
-Mobile Requests upon Static Resources: In this case, the access control decision for the requestor is dependent on the current location of the requestor ((e.g, an employee (mobile requestor) tries to use the printer in the office (static resource)) as in policy 2 in section 2. Therefore, in order to gain access to the static resources such as a printer, the requestor must be located in the authorized region. -Mobile Requests upon Mobile Resources: In this case, locations of both entities (requestors and resources) are important (e.g., a boss (mobile requestor) tries to access the locations of her employees (mobile resource) as policy 3 in section 2).
In the rest of this section, we will focus on the first and third user request types because the second query type can be considered as a special case of the third query type where location conditions of mobile resources are not considered. Then, we can simplify the categorization as static requests (the first case) or mobile request (the third case).
Definition 2 (Static Requests). A static request (SR), denoted as a triple
where s is a subject of the user request, 2 is a spatiotemporal region, and m is a track, a locate, or a view access mode.
The result of SR would be a trajectory, a position, or identifiers of a moving object(s). A trajectory is of the form o, {loc 1 , loc 2 . . . , loc n } , where o is the object identifier, and loc i is the i th location information of o in the x, y, t dimensional space. In case of locate, the result would be of the form o, loc . The result of a view access mode would be a set of object identifiers. We use U.s, U 2 , U.m to denote the subject, the spatiotemporal extent, and the access mode of the access request U , respectively. Also, the effective time interval of U is denoted as [U.τ b , U.τ e ], which is derived from U 2 .
The spatiotemporal query evaluation is based on the overlaying procedure that is introduced in the section 5.1. For a given user request U , the procedure first locates a set of roots from the root array of S P P F such that the alive time interval of the root overlaps with [U.τ b , U.τ e ]. resultSet ← EvaluateSubtree(r, U ) ∪ resultSet 7:
Algorithm 4 QueryEvaluationSR
end if 8: end for 9: return Retrieve(resultSet, R, U ) {location, trajectory, or ID information of resultSet is retrieved depending on U.m} Then, for each located root r, the procedure described in algorithm 4 (QueryEvaluationSR), traverses the subtree under this root r until it reaches the leaf level by using algorithm 5. The worst case running time of algorithm 5 is O(nk + m) where n is the number of moving objects, k is the number of elements in the root array and m is the number of authorizations which are overlaid on the tree. This is because the cost of visiting nodes is exactly the same as when overlaying authorizations, while the cost of searching the authorizations also needs to be factored in (in the worst case all authorizations are overlaid on all of the nodes). During this traversal, it compares the spatiotemporal extent of user request with that of each node in the search path. One would encounter three different cases:
-enclosing: If there exists any α SM such that a set of subjects evaluated by ce contains U.s, then return all the moving objects that are overlapped with (U 2 ∩ α 2 ). In the case of the locate access mode, return the location information of those objects at time = U.τ b . Because, if we allow time interval, the trajectory information during the time interval [U.τ b , U.τ e ] is rather revealed to the user instead of the location information, U.τ e is ignored if it is different from U.τ b . If a track access mode is requested, return the trajectory information of those objects. The trajectory of each object o in the result set is traced back by using the pointer N.ptr where N is the leaf node that stores o. Whenever a node L is time split, ptr of newly created node is set to point back to the original node L. Thus, all the past location information of o can be reached by following the ptr created each time a node is split. This tracking is processed within the spatiotemporal region U 2 ∩ α 2 where α 2 is the spatiotemporal region of all the authorizations with track privilege that are applicable to U.s.
-overlapping: If there exists any α SM such that the set of subjects evaluated by ce contains U.s, return the objects overlapping with U 2 only. However, we still need to check authorizations overlaid for the descendants of the node N because authorizations overlaid for the descendants may include another spatiotemporal region that α 2 does not cover. In the case of the leaf node, return all the moving objects that are overlapped with (N 2 ∩α 2 ∩U 2 ). Again, if it is a track access mode, return the trajectory information of those objects. If it is a locate access mode, return the location information.
-disjoint: Stop the evaluation process because no relevant authorizations can be found in the descendants of the node N to satisfy the request.
Definition 3 (Mobile Requests). A mobile request (MR), denoted as
where s is the subject of the user request, loc is the current location of the subject in the x, y, t dimensional space, 2 is a spatiotemporal region, and m is a track, locate, or view access mode.
In MR, we use M.s, M loc , M 2 , and M.m to denote the subject, the spatiotemporal position of M.s, the spatiotemporal extent, the access mode of the access request M respectively. Also, the effective time interval of M which is derived from M 2 , is denoted as [M.τ b , M.τ e ]. Observe that in order to process mobile requests upon static resources, M 2 is set to null, and α M S is evaluated instead of α M M . if N is a leaf node then 10:
if authorized = f alse AND LL = ∅ then 11:
for each object o in N .objects do 12:
for each authorization α in LL do 13: There are two spatiotemporal conditions involved in MR: the current location of M.s is used to evaluate if M.s is authorized to access moving objects information, and M 2 specifies the spatiotemporal region that M.s wants to retrieve where moving objects are positioned within. Therefore, we need to traverse the tree twice: one traversal for checking if there exists any authorization issued for M.s, and another traversal for retrieving the authorized moving objects for M 2 . During the first traversal process, only the alive root node among the root array is traversed because the access control decision for the subject's condition is evaluated only by the M.s's location at t c . Therefore, the algorithm traverses from the alive root node until it reaches the leaf level. During the traversal, it checks if the spatiotemporal extent of each node in the search path includes the M loc . If any authorization of type α M M applicable to M.s has been found during the traversal, α 2O is compared with M 2 . There are three different cases for this comparison:
, the spatiotemporal region of the user request are authorized to access by M.s. Therefore, stop traversing the tree for locating authorizations issued for M.s, and start traversing the tree to retrieve the moving objects that are within M 2 . Observe that for the second traversal, there is no need to evaluate authorizations further because it is already evaluated by the first traversal.
is overlapped with M 2 , only the intersection area between α 2O and M 2 is the spatiotemporal region that the user wants to access while meeting the security requirement. Therefore, continue traversing, and compute union of all the intersecting area until the traversal finishes, and retrieve the moving objects that are within the intersecting area.
during the traversal implies that M.s is allowed to access moving objects within α 2O , the authorized spatiotemporal region, α 2O , is not within the user's interest. Therefore, this authorization is not relevant for M , and we need to evaluate more authorizations of type α M M by continuing the traversal.
If no authorization is found, continue traversal. In case traversal reaches a leaf node N , for each authorization α M M overlaid on N , include α 2O if intersection area between N 2 and α 2O encloses M loc since we do not want to get the false positive result for the area N 2 − α 2O . Algorithm 6 QueryEvaluationMR discusses the details of processing MR. As discussed earlier, the worst case running time of this algorithm is also O(nk + m) where n is the number of moving objects, k is the number of elements in the root array and m is the number of authorizations which are overlaid on the tree.
Performance Evaluation of the S P P F -tree
We have conducted experiments measuring the performance of the S P P F -tree. The S P P F -tree was implemented in C++, and the experiments were run using generated if LL = ∅ then 7: for each authorization α in LL do 8: if
← ∪ α end for 12: end if 13: end if 14: return Retrieve(R, , M ) {depending on M.m, location, trajectory, or ID of moving objects are returned if the objects are located within the } 15: else 16: 
LL ← CheckUserIDAuth(s, α M M ) 18: if LL = ∅ then 19: if α 2O ⊃ x,y,t M 2 then 20:
return Retrieve(R, , M.m)
22:
else if α 2O ⊃ x,y,t M 2 then
23:
← ∪ α return result 33: end if data. For the experimental setup, we define a 3-dimensional spatiotemporal space (x, y, and t axes). All the moving objects move within this space and all the authorizations are also applied in this space. To simulate the moving object database, we randomly generate an initial location (x and y coordinates), velocities for the x and y dimensions, and the moving object's insertion time to the index using a uniform distribution. As a result, there are groups of moving objects that are being inserted into the tree for a given time point. Similarly, authorizations are randomly generated: their spatiotemporal extents within the given 3-dimensional space, and auth-objects list or subject list depending on the type of an authorization are randomly generated.
User Access Request Performance: We have performed two sets of experiments for SR and MR: In the first set, we generate workloads that vary authorization/object ratios (the number of authorizations to the number of moving object data) when the number of moving object data has been fixed at 60,000. This allows us to see the effect of increasing number of authorizations on the overall performance. In the second set, we vary the number of moving objects when the auth-object ratio has been fixed at 0.5. This allows us to see the effect of number of objects on the overall performance.
In general, in order to evaluate any user access request, there are three different kinds of costs incurred. Given a particular user access request, the costs involved are:
1. Authorization Search Cost: This is the cost of searching for relevant authorizations from the set of authorizations. 2. Moving Object Search Cost: This is the cost of identifying the moving objects that lie within the spatiotemporal extent of the user access request. 3. Filtering Cost: This is the cost of checking if there exists any authorization specified for the requester to access the identified moving object. Essentially this is the cost of matching the result sets from the access control evaluation module and the moving object processing module.
In order to measure the performance benefit due to the S P P F -tree, in each experiment, we evaluate the following four cases:
1. Case 1. No Index: Both moving object data and authorizations are not indexed. In this case, all the three of the above costs come into play. 2. Case 2. R P P F & No Index: The moving object data is indexed using R P P F -tree but authorizations are not been indexed. In this case, all the three of the above costs come into play. 3. Case 3. R P P F & R: The moving object data is indexed using R P P F -tree and authorizations are indexed using R-tree. Authorizations can be organized by using R-tree because each authorization includes the corresponding spatiotemporal extent in the mobile environment, and any multi-dimensional index structure such as Rtree can be used to index authorizations. In this case, all the three of the above costs come into play. 4. Case 4. S P P F -tree: The moving object data and authorizations are indexed using the unified index, the proposed S P P F -tree. In this case, only the first two of the above costs come into play. We assume that data is stored serially in a disk, and the sizes of disk access page and data (moving object data and authorizations) are 8k bytes and 32 bytes respectively. Therefore, if no index structure is used for moving object data or authorizations (i.e. Case 1 for both and Case 2 for authorizations), we increment the number of disk access I/O by one for every 256 authorizations or moving object data accessed. Thus, the cost of search operation is assumed to be linear in the case of no index structure available. We assume that R-tree and R P P F -tree are disk-based, and whenever a node is accessed, we increment the disk access I/O during the search of authorizations and moving object data.
In case of the S P P F -tree, we assume that each node id is stored in the disk, and whenever a node is accessed, we increment the disk access I/O by one. The implementation is memory-based, but each node stores the cache for its children or moving object data information, which enables us to simulate the disk access I/O: first, the cache is searched to find candidate nodes to navigate further, and then, only the accessed candidate node will increase the disk access I/O. Whenever a node is visited during processing a user access request, overlaid authorizations on the node are evaluated if any of the overlaid authorizations are applicable to the requester. Because we assume that overlaid authorizations on a node are stored serially in a file, whenever 256 authorizations are accessed, we increment the disk access I/O by one following the same assumption used in case 1 and 2. Initially, the S P P F -tree is empty. First, the specified number of moving objects are bulk-loaded, and then, the specified number of authorizations are batch-overlaid on the tree. Figures 12 and  14 show that the number of I/O operations for S P P F -tree increases slowly due to our user request evaluation process: more authorizations will be overlaid on a node as the number of overlaying authorizations increases, but if there exists any authorization that is applicable to the requester in node N which is located at the higher level of the tree, authorization evaluation does not need to be performed any more for the descendent nodes of N . The simulation confirms this argument. However, the performance of other benchmark cases (e.g., case 1, 2, and 3) is seriously affected because the number of evaluated authorizations will increase proportionally as the number of authorizations increases.
In order to investigate the scalability of the S P P F -tree, we experiment with varying the number of moving objects when the authorizations/objects ratio is fixed. Figure 13 and 15 show the number of disk I/O operations on average for performing SR and MR respectively when the auth-object ratio has been fixed to 0.5. The result shows that in all four cases, the number of disk I/O is proportional to the number of moving objects, but the increase rate of disk I/O operations for S P P F is slower than other benchmark cases.
Index Construction Performance: Next, we evaluate the cost of index construction. Figure 16 compares the time required to construct S P P F -tree and R P P F -tree by varying the number of moving objects when the authorization/object ratio is fixed to 0.5. S P P Ftree is constructed by first creating R P P F -tree and carefully overlaying authorizations on nodes of R P P F -tree: the resultant tree is S P P F -tree. Therefore, the construction time of S P P F -tree includes both the construction time of the R P P F -tree for moving objects and the authorizations overlaying time. The bulk-loading process results in in- creasing the time required for the authorizations overlaying process since there exist more moving objects: during bulk-loading process of moving object data, time splits tends to occur at the same time point. For example, given the example shown in section 4, 6 moving objects are all being inserted to R P P F -tree at time 0. Then, the time interval for root node would be [0,0] and [0, ∞]. If this is the case, then during the overlaying process, any authorization that is applicable from time 0 will need to visit all the elements in the root array. As a result, the root array does not effectively differentiate the valid time duration of data. This reasoning explains why the overlaying process takes more time during the construction process.
Update Performance: We have performed experiments to measure the update cost of S P P F -tree. The first experiment shown in Figure 17 measures the number of I/O operations for updating moving object data in S P P F -tree when authorization/object ratio varies while the number of moving object data is fixed at 10,000. In this experiment, 10,000 moving objects are bulk-loaded into the tree initially, and then, 2000 updates are gradually performed over 100 time units, and the corresponding disk I/O operations during the updates are measured. Update (insertion/deletion) of moving object data in S P P F -tree incurs two different types of I/O operations: the structural change of S P P Ftree, and the reorganization of the overlaid authorizations. Updates to moving objects may cause a structural change when time split or node splitting occurs. In this case, all the authorizations overlaid on the access nodes need to be re-evaluated. Because re-evaluation of overlaid authorizations incurs I/O cost, whenever 256 of the authorizations are accessed, we increment the disk access I/O by one using the same assumption. Also, if we find an authorization that does not fit in the originally overlaid node, we need to remove the authorizations from the node, and re-overlay them on the tree, which also incurs I/O costs. Similarly, as time elapses, the authorization log overlays newly applicable authorizations on the tree and removes those that are not applicable to the tree. It is obvious that as the number of overlaid authorizations increases, the number of I/O operations would increase linearly to the number of overlaid authorizations because if a node is being updated, each of the overlaid authorizations on the node will need to be evaluated if the spatiotemporal extent of the authorization still encloses (or overlaps with, if the node is leaf node) that of the node. Also, if there is any authorization applicable to the tree as time elapses, it is overlaid on the tree by the authorization log. Next, we consider a more realistic scenario where updates and user access requests 6 are intermixed. After 10,000 moving objects are inserted into the tree at the same time, various number of updates and user requests are performed to measure the average disk I/O operations during these operations. In all cases, 10,000 authorizations are generated and overlaid onto the tree. Since valid time intervals of the authorizations are uniformly distributed, not all the authorizations are overlaid on the tree during the batchoverlaying process: authorizations of which valid interval are [t 0 , t 0 + H] where t 0 is the bulk-loading insertion time of moving objects and H is the time horizon are only overlaid on the tree. 7 As time elapses, the authorization log removes authorizations that are not applicable to the tree, and overlays newly applicable authorizations. We perform two different experiments: in the first, shown in Figure 18 , we experiment with workloads that vary the query-update ratios (the number of user requests to the number of updates) when the number of update have been fixed at 2,000. This allows to us to measure the effect of increasing the number of queries. In the second experiment shown in Figure 19 , we vary the number of updates when the query-update ratio has been fixed by 0.5. This allows to see the effect of updates on the performance. 6 In this experiment, we only consider SR type of user requests because the experimental performance results of SR and MR shows the same pattern: S P P F -tree performs best, and other benchmark cases are performed well in order order of R P P F & R, R P P F & No Index, and No Index. 7 In this experiment, time horizon H is set to 20 time units. Figure 18 shows that as the query-update ratio is increased, the disk I/O operations of S P P F -tree is reduced compared to the "R P P F & R" case. This is obvious because the I/O operations of user access request in S P P F -tree is smaller than that of the other benchmark cases, and therefore, as query-update ratio is increased, the average disk operation of S P P F -tree is reduced if the number of updates are fixed. Thus, although the overall performance of S P P F -tree is worse than that of the "R P P F & R" case in the query-update ratio less than 0.5, the performance cross-over occurs at the queryupdate ratio of approximately 0.6.
8 Figure 19 shows that as the number of updates are increased, the disk I/O operations of S P P F -tree is increasing compared to the "R P P F & R" case as long as the update-query ratio is fixed. This experimental result shows that the extra overhead cost of S P P F -tree by maintaining authorizations on the tree can be offset by the performance gains from the user request evaluation of S P P F -tree.
Related Work
Recently, there has been some endeavors to support effectively evaluating queries of past, present and future locations of moving objects. Patel et al. [17] index the positions that result from the dual data transformation. Lin et al. [14] propose the BB x -index structure that inherits the ability to index present and future positions from the B x -tree [13] , and it extends this ability with support for also past positions. However, BB
x -index does not correct trajectory segments and therefore, the index may include disconnected trajectories. Pelanis et al. [18] address this problem by applying partial persistence to the TPR-tree [19] and correcting the last-recorded prediction of moving object.
An index scheme for moving object data and user profiles has been proposed by Atluri et al. [4] , but this does not consider authorizations. Beresford et al. [10] , [20] have proposed techniques that let users benefit from location-based applications, while preserving their location privacy. Mobile users, in general, do not permit the information shared among different location based services. Primarily, the approach relies on hiding the true identity of a customer from the applications receiving the user's location, by frequently changing pseudonyms so that users avoid being identified by the locations they visit. A system for delivering permission-based location-aware mobile advertisements to mobile phones using Bluetooth positioning and Wireless WAP Push has been developed [1] . An index structure has been proposed to index authorizations ensuring that the customer profile information be disclosed to the merchants based on the choice of the customers [26] . However, this provides separate index structures for data and authorizations, and therefore is not a unified index.
Regarding the location privacy, Gruteser and Grunwald have proposed the concept of location k-anonymity which is defined as the state where location information of a mobile user is indistinguishable from the location information of at least k − 1 other mobile users [12] . The location k-anonymity is achieved by creating a spatiotemporal region that includes k − 1 other mobile users. In other words, for any submitted mobile user request, the location information is transformed into a spatiotemporal region such that would include k mobile users. Therefore, in order to achieve location k-anonymity, it is necessary to track all the user locations, and it is assumed that the trusted third party such as location server assumes that role of providing the location k-anonymity. Mokbel, Chow, and Aref [15] have proposed a solution that allows a mobile user to specify the minimum level of k and the smallest area that should be forwarded to the service providers. A multi-level grid-based index structure is used to efficiently compute the spatiotemporal region. The main contribution is efficient processing of location k-anonymity even though each user's privacy requirement is different. Shin, Atluri, and Vaidya [21] extended the notion of k-anonymity by proposing a profile based kanonymization model that guarantees anonymity even when profiles of mobile users are known to untrusted entities. Their generalization methods generalize both location and profiles to the extent specified by the user. However, none of these approaches deal with security issues in mobile environment. Thus, they are orthogonal to our approach.
In [8] , Atluri and Guo have proposed a unified indexing scheme for moving objects and authorizations, called S TPR-tree. However, because S TPR-tree does not maintain historical information on moving objects, it does not support security policies based on tracking of mobile users. The focus of this paper is to provide persistence for unified indexing scheme for mobile objects and authorizations.
The problem of enforcing security policies in a geospatial data environment is similar to that in a mobile environment. Atluri and Mazzoleni [9] have proposed a unified index for geospatial data and authorizations, called RMX-Quadtree. Since RMX-tree is not capable of handling the temporal attributes associated with the data as well as authorizations, the * -tree [6, 7] has been proposed. The 3-dimensional nature of the * -tree allows objects and authorizations to be indexed based on their temporal attributes (in addition to indexing them based on their spatial attributes). However, all of these works are orthogonal to our work because the data objects being indexed are static.
Conclusions and Future Research
A number of services in the area of mobile commerce environment require maintaining mobile object's location information and efficiently serving access requests on past, present and future status of the moving objects. Proper access control policies must be enforced to address the security and privacy concerns in this environment. Recently, Atluri and Guo have proposed an unified index structure, S TPR-tree, to organize both the moving objects and authorizations specified over them. However, the S TPR-tree is not capable of answering queries based on the past information, and therefore cannot support security policies based on tracking of mobile users. In this paper, we have proposed an index structure, called the S P P F -tree, which maintains past, present and future positions of the moving objects along with authorizations by employing partial persistent storage, and therefore can support authorizations based on tracking of mobile objects.
Support for negative authorizations require significant changes to the overlaying of authorizations as well as evaluating access requests. In this paper, we do not consider negative authorizations; we will extend our work to support negative authorizations. The authorizations can also be organized better than simply in the form of a sequential list. Such organization would further improve the overall performance. Also, the analytical model for evaluating the performance of the unified index needs to be developed. The analytical model would be useful to better understand the behavior of the unified index so that we may improve the performance based on the analysis. Also, the analysis result can be utilized to compare the expected performance with currently developed models. Finally, efficient processing of continuous query needs to be developed while preserving the security requirements of mobile users. Traditional database systems are designed to answer transient, snapshot queries over persistent data [11] . However, in a mobile environment, a query can be long-running (for example, find 10 nearest employees of mine during my movement from warehouse A and B), and the result of the submitted query needs to be updated accordingly as the locations of both the requester (e.g., boss) and resources (e.g., locations of employees) are changing. These queries are called continuous, and they arise in location-based services [11] . In this paper, we do not consider continuous query; we will extend our work to support continuous query as well as preserving the security requirements.
